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FEDERAL JURISDICTION: THE PERILS AND
REWARDS OF PULLING THINGS
TOGETHER
Gene A Shreve*
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JU-
DICIAL POWER. By Martin H. Redish. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
Co. 1980. Pp. xiii, 361. $25.
Professor Redish's book about the nature and limits of federal
jurisdiction enters a field previously occupied by innumerable law
review articles and books treating only parts of the subject.' No
stranger to the field, 2 he has produced a treatise of exceptional merit.
* Visiting Associate Professor, The National Law Center, George Washington University.
LL.B. 1968, LL.M. 1975, Harvard University. - Ed.
1. A list of some of the most prominent books might include: AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1967)
(federal question and diversity jurisdiction, removal); P. CARRINOTON, D. MEADOR & M. Ro-
SENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976) (federal appellate jurisdiction); 0. FIss, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) (the relationship of remedies to federal jurisdiction in civil rights
cases); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1973) (jurisdiction of lower federal courts); G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 1975) (admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion, federal common law); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (5th ed.
1978) (Supreme Court jurisdiction).
Several casebooks in the field should also be noted. See P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P.
MISHKIN & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS (2d ed. 1975); C. MCCORMICK, J.
CHADBOURN & C. WRIGHT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS (6th ed. 1976).
They offer greater scope but are not intended to synthesize and clarify material as Professor
Redish does in his book.
Finally, Professor Charles Alan Wright's excellent work, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FED-
ERAL COURTS (3d ed. 1976), should be noted. Although Professor Wright wrote the book for
law students, it has reached a far greater and more sophigticated audience. It surveys issues of
federal subject matter jurisdiction that are the concern of Professor Redish's book, as well as
many other areas, ag., the federal rules of civil procedure, personal jurisdiction and res judi-
cata. Professor Wright's book often does not, as a consequence, treat Professor Redish's sub-
jects with comparable length and detail.
2. Two articles by Professor Redish now appear in "slightly revised" form as chapters in
this book. See Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search ofthe Approprl-
ate Dilemma, 91 HARv. L. REV. 356 (1977) (appearing as chapter 7); Redish, The Anti-Injunc-
lion Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 717 (1977) (appearing as chapter 10).
He has published a number of other articles in the field. See Continuing the Erie Debate: A
Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REV. 959 (1980); Revitalizing Civil Rights Re-
moval Jurisdiction, 64 MINN. L. REv. 523 (1980); The Doctrine o/Younger v. Harris: De/erence
in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (1978); with Muench, Adudication of Fed-
eral Causes o/Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1976); with Woods, Congressional
Power to Control the Jurisdiction o/Lower Federal Courts: A Crtical Review anda New Synthe-
sis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975).
Federal Jurisdiction
He has attempted to design the book so that it can be read on two
levels. First, and most successfully, he has written a collection of
analytic essays on what he calls "twelve of the leading areas of fed-
eral jurisdiction."' 3 Most of the essays explore some aspect of the
relationship between the state and federal courts. A scholar writing
in an area so complex and, at times, controversial, necessarily runs
the opposing risks of temporization and dogmatic assertion. Profes-
sor Redish falls prey to neither. While he develops and applies his
own critical judgments on issues where viewpoints have differed, he
is also scrupulously fair in presenting the other side.4 The result is
not a monograph but a treatise in the true sense of the word.
The second, and perhaps intellectually more important level is
more difficult to understand. Professor Redish's introduction confi-
dently asserts that "the chapters are designed to be linked with one
another on a broader level, as applications of a unified approach to
the issues of judicial federalism. ' '5 Despite his good intentions, how-
ever, the unified approach, if there is one, never materializes. In-
deed, it is difficult to see how it could have, given the diversity of the
topics that make up the various chapters. Some subjects simply lack
discernible strands of federalism - for example, the discussion of
whether the Supreme Court exercises original or appellate jurisdic-
tion in a given class of cases (pp. 11-12), and comparisons between
article I and article III courts (pp. 35-51). Most of the other topics
treated at least arguably involve the tensions of federalism. 6 But the
contexts and characteristics of each issue vary so greatly that it is
difficult to imagine how they could be successfully unified in one
coherent theory of federal jurisdiction. Assuming that interests of
3. P. 1. "Each chapter attempts to describe and to criticize the current state of the law as
embodied in judicial decisions as well as in the theories of leading commentators." P. I. Titles
of the twelve chapters explain clearly the coverage of the book: (1) "Congressional Power to
Control Federal Court Jurisdiction," (2) "Legislative Courts," (3) "The Scope of Lower Fed-
eral Court Power to Interpret Federal Law: Federal Question Jurisdiction," (4) "The Power
of the Federal Courts to Fashion Federal Common Law," (5) "State Courts and Federal
Power," (6) "Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment," (7) "Erie and the Rules of
Decision Act," (8) "Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions: Procedural Limita-
tions," (9) "Abstention," (10) "The Anti-Injunction Statute," (11) "Our Federalism," and
(12) "Civil Rights Removal Jurisdiction." P. ix.
4. See, e.g., his exchange with Professor Fiss, described in note 21 infra.'
5. P. 1. He continues: "The critique of decisions and theories advanced here, as well as
the suggestions for alternative approaches contained within each chapter, may be seen as an
attempt to reorganize the values and priorities underlying the allocation of judicial power." P.
1 (citation omitted).
6. E.g., p. 8 (the constitutional debates); p. 62 (scope of federal question jurisdiction); pp.
80 & 93 (federal common law); p. 119 (state court adjudication of federal claims); p. 197 (Erie);
pp. 216-17 (Supreme Court review of state decisions); pp. 259-60 (the anti-injunction statute -
28 U.S.C. § 2283).
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federalism have been violated, how does one equate the unwar-
ranted displacement of state governing law7 with the unwarranted
displacement of state judicial forums, 8 or either with the unwar-
ranted revision of state judicial decisions?9 If there are answers to
these questions, they do not appear in Redish's book. Each chapter
begins a new topic'0 and is relatively self-contained. There is no
concluding chapter. Unless the author chooses to elaborate upon his
theories elsewhere, the puzzle of his second theme may remain for-
ever locked in the book's introduction."
I
Federal Jurisdiction criticizes, as well as summarizes, the law.
Professor Redish reserves his most trenchant criticisms for those who
would invoke the doctrine of federalism to deny a federal forum to
plaintiffs with federal claims. He states at the outset that "the integ-
rity of the Article III federal courts as the primary adjudicators of
federal law must be preserved" (p. 1), and that "[a]n individual
should. . . be presumed to be able to obtain judicial vindication of
his federal rights in federal, rather than state court" (p. 1). He flatly
rejects the common counterargument that federal and state courts
provide an equal opportunity for the vindication of federal rights (p.
2). Plaintiffs, he concludes, should not be forced to assert their fed-
eral claims before unsympathetic and perhaps less competent state
judges.' 2
The villain here is not Congress, but rather the far-reaching ab-
7. Either through violation of the Erie doctrine or excessive federal common law.
8. For example, through unwarranted federal question jurisdiction.
9. Either directly through unwarranted Supreme Court review or collaterally through
abuse of federal habeas corpus.
10. See note 3 supra.
1I. This would be more of a concern had the author not succeeded so admirably in the
book's first purpose. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, it is difficult to see how
both objectives could be realized in the same book.
12. Since the federal courts were given general federal question jurisdiction in 1875,
those courts have developed a broad expertise in dealing with problems and applications
at federal law. At the same time, state judges have been increasingly less exposed to the
intricacies of federal substantive legal principles. Moreover, the fact that federal judges
are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate assures a floor of competence
of the federal bench. There is no such assurance for state judges. Finally, federal judges
retain the salary and life tenure protections of Article III, while many state judges must
stand for election, a fact which significantly undermines their independence.
P. 119 (footnote omitted).
An interesting dialogue on the appropriate roles of state and federal courts in the adjudica-
tion of federal rights can be found in the contributions of Professors Bator, Cover, Field,
Newbourne, and others in the Symposium, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's, 22 WM.
& MARY L. Rav. 599 (1981).
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stention doctrine established recently in Younger v. Harris.13 A fed-
eral court's power to refuse to adjudicate a federal question properly
brought before it is based upon the principle of self-restraint, derived
from the equitable nature of the remedy sought. The decision
whether to hear a case, then, involves a determination of whether
"Our Federalism" (p. 298) 14 might be better served by requiring the
plaintiff to press his claim in state, rather than federal court. Unlike
the earlier and narrower Pullman abstention doctrine, 15 which at
least required the existence of an unclear or unsettled issue of state
law,' 6 Younger may deprive a plaintiff of the right to litigate before a
federal tribunal when there is any possibility of a state remedy. As
originally set out, Younger expressly applied only against plaintiffs
seeking to enjoin ongoing state criminal prosecutions by filing a civil
rights suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17 The doctrine
has since been extended to cover declaratory judgments against
criminal proceedings. 18 It has also been used to protect pending
state civil proceedings,' 9 even when they involved only private par-
13. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
14. The phrase, of course, is Justice Black's. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
15. Railroad Commn. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
16. Pullman is the more limited and less onerous of the two doctrines. The Pullman doc-
trine applies when, first, the need to invalidate a state statute or regulation as unconstitutional
can be avoided if state law is given a certain meaning and, second, that meaning is not clear
enough for a federal court to feel comfortable in declaring, but is within the greater interpre-
tive power of a state court to define.
When a federal constitutional question is not raised, rules governing abstention are more
difficult to determine. Compare Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S.
25 (1959), with Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
There are a number of ways in which possibilities under state law have been used under
the Pullman doctrine to avoid reaching the federal constitutional issues. The state law issue
might be whether the challenged state statute might be defined so as to avoid constitutional
problems, Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Natl. Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979), whether the
challenged statute might not also violate the state constitution, Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82
(1970), or whether the case might not be disposed of short of considering the state statute or
regulation under attack. Railroad Commn. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
Professor Redish has strongly criticized the deference that the federal courts accord the
state courts when confronted with unresolved and important questions of statutory construc-
tion. He notes that "the federal court is certainly as capable as its state counterpart of constru-
ing state statutes in a manner that avoids constitutional difficulties." P. 234. The Supreme
Court, however, continues to regard state supreme courts as the highest arbiters of the meaning
of state law. See Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 n.9 (1978). Re-
cently the Supreme Court again applied the Pullman doctrine, this time to permit the Arizona
courts the opportunity to apply a curative interpretation to portions of an Arizona statute.
Babbit v. United Farm Workers Natl. Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The exceptions to the doctrine were and are
narrow and difficult to satisfy. See pp. 304-07.
18. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), discussedat pp. 303-04.
19. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainer v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434
(1977), discussed at pp. 316-18; Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
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ties.20 It has sometimes been invoked to protect even state proceed-
ings commenced after a federal suit was filed.21 The Younger
doctrine, moreover, differs significantly from the Pullman doctrine in
that its invocation leads to dismissal of the federal complaint and
submits the frustrated plaintiff to the risks of claim or issue preclu-
sion generated by the state case.22
I share some of Professor Redish's dissatisfaction over the broad-
based withdrawal of federal trial forums for the adjudication of im-
portant federal rights - a particular (if not actually intended) conse-
quence of the Younger doctrine. I think, however, that an equity
analysis can do more to resolve the problem than Professor Redish
suspects.23
The principal vice of the usual Younger-type analysis is rigidity.
Professor Redish notes:
Except for the extremely narrow exceptions mentioned in Younger,
deference under the doctrine is total in scope. The federal court makes
no decision on the merits of the federal plaintiffs constitutional claims.
Instead, the court informs the plaintiff that he has brought his claim to
the wrong forum - in effect, that he has followed an incorrect proce-
dure in seeking to have his constitutional claim adjudicated. [Pp. 300-
01.]
No matter how desperate the plaintiff's plight, if he falls within the
ambit of the rule, he loses. The principal virtue, conversely, of a
traditional equity analysis is flexibility.24 Close cases should be de-
cided not by hard-and-fast rules - which ignore the balance of the
equities between the plaintiff and the defendant 25 - but by particu-
20. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), discussed at p. 318.
21. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), discussed at pp. 314-15. Shortly thereafter,
however, a future criminal prosecution was enjoined in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977). Professor Redish is uncertain about the force of Wooley but, with characteristic fair-
ness, he presents the somewhat opposing view of Professor Fiss, who suggests that the way for
injunctions against future prosecutions is clear. See pp. 312-13. I am inclined to agree with
Professor Fiss, particularly in light of Zablocki v. Redhail, 334 U.S. 374, 379 n.5 (1978), de-
cided after Wooley.
22. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). In 411en the Court held that the plaintiff
was collaterally estopped from relitigating in a § 1983 damage suit a search and seizure issue
that had been adjudicated in plaintifi's prior state criminal proceeding.
23. He notes cryptically that "reliance on equity doctrines... only serves to distort the
delicate balancing of competing state and federal interests which should be the true focus of
the inquiry." P. 293.
24. Granted, a plaintiff threatened with a constitutional wrong may be left without a pre-
ventative remedy. It may be appropriate for the court, in its equitable discretion, to deny a
civil rights injunction, even in compelling cases of need, if the force of countervailing consider-
ations of federalism is strong enough.
25. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES 357 (1973). The same inquiry is
sometimes expressed as balancing the harms: Will it be more difficult for the defendant to live
with the injunction than it will be for the plaintiff to live without it?
[Vol. 80:688
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larized weighing of individual factors, the method characteristic of
discretionary decision-making.26 Cases so decided would then both
provide material for the development of a methodology to be used
by federal trial judges in deciding questions of abstention and set
outer limits for appellate review.27 Using equitable discretion, how-
ever, to justify the imposition of hard-and-fast rules conditioning the
exercise of federal jurisdiction, is a distortion and an abuse of judi-
cial method. The Younger doctrine, in short, unjustifiably suspends
the civil rights plaintiff's statutory right to litigate the merits of his
claim in federal court.
II
Whatever the intrinsic merit of the Younger doctrine, its effects
are largely indirect, at least in the limited sense that plaintiffs' rights
remain theoretically undiminished. This may soon change. The
most significant development in the field since Federal Jurisdiction
was published may be the mood and movement in Congress to re-
duce the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts. Largely be-
cause of the delay and uncertainty invariably encountered in
attempts to overrule unpopular Supreme Court decisions by consti-
tutional amendment, members of Congress are attempting to achieve
the same end by introducing bills that will deprive lower courts of
the opportunity to follow certain constitutional precedents and the
Supreme Court of the power to enforce them. Bills pending at this
writing would withdraw the authority of some or all federal courts to
hear cases involving abortion, 28 prayer in public schools, 29 and
26. See Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right - TowardA New Methodology of Deci-
sionmaking, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 894, 925 n.133 (1980).
27. It is far from clear that federal appellate courts should repeat the entire weighing pro-
cess for each discretionary decision. The concept of discretion suggests a more restricted ap-
pellate role. Id. at 900 n.20.
28. See S. 583, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 73, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 867,
97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981). A more sophisticated approach can be found in S. 158, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S287-88 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981). The first section of each defines the right to life, protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, as beginning with conception. The second section of
each withdraws the authority of inferior article III courts to grant injunctive and declaratory
relief in abortion cases. Each also invokes section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, presumably
to provide Congress with added legislative authority. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Fitzpatrick and Hutto support the special
authority of Congress, derived from § 5, to suspend the effect of the eleventh amendment. It is
at least doubtful, however, that section 5 confers upon Congress the authority to override the
Supreme Court's own reading of the fourteenth amendment: "Tlhe word 'person', as used in
the fourteenth amendment, does not include the unborn." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158
(1973).
29. See S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S1284 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1981); H.R.
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school desegregation.30 The possibility that some of these bills, or
others like them, will be enacted is substantial.3'
Professor Redish's opening chapter carefully surveys the case law
and scholarly commentary on the power of Congress to restrict the
jurisdiction of federal courts under article III of the Constitution.
After reviewing the possibility of inferring limitations on Congress
from the language of article III itself, and after examining the added
problems of due process and the separation of powers, Professor
Redish cautiously concludes that Congress probably can selectively
restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Some of the authorities
whose views he discusses32 - as well as some who have made their
views known only recently33 - have reached the opposite conclu-
sion. Still, the chapter does provide an excellent foundation and
point of departure for further examination of a problem that recently
has become so important.
Other developments, too, have unfolded since the appearance of
the book. Covering so much ground in so fast-moving an area, Pro-
fessor Redish faced the certainty that the book would soon begin to
be outdated. There is no longer an amount-in-controversy require-
ment in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 34 and two recent Supreme Court deci-
sions35 would prompt him to alter his conclusions about the vitality
of federal environmental common law.3 6 Other cases were decided
408,97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); H.R. 865, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 2347, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981).
30. See H.R. 869, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
31. Shortly after his retirement, Justice Potter Stewart observed, "There have been such
bills ever since I've been here. The problem now is that they seem more likely to pass." Justice
Stewart (Retired), NEw YORKER, Oct. 19, 1981, at 36. See Kaufman, Congress v. The Court,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 44.
32. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953) (extensively cited throughout chapter 1);
Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498
(1974), discussed at p. 23; Ratner, Congressional Power Over the 4ppellate Jurisdiction ofthe
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1960), discussed at p. 19.
33. Raoul Berger, who largely agrees with Redish's position, particularly notes the diverg-
ing views of Lawrence Tribe and John Hart Ely. See Berger, Congressional Contraction of
Federal Jurisdiction, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 807, 807. For an excellent recent treatment of this
subject, see Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Foreword- Constitutional Limitations on
Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17
(1981).
34. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94
Stat. 2369 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (Supp. 1981)). Professor Redish refers to the now
outdated requirement as one "well known to any attorney who litigates in federal court." P.
21.
35. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981); Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
36. See pp. 105-07. The author bases his analysis primarily on Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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in time to be cited in the book but received insufficient attention,
perhaps due to publication deadlines. Treatment of Walker v. Arrmco
Steel Corp.37 is confined to one footnote (p. 180 n.98), though the
case is quite relevant to the Rules of Decision Act 38 perspective that
Professor Redish brings to bear on the Erie problem (p. 171). He
devotes a chapter to Supreme Court doctrine requiring exhaustion of
state judicial remedies, but discussion of Moore v. Sims, 39 an impor-
tant case, is confined to two footnotes (pp. 307 n.108, 318 n.171).
Of course, publishers' page proofs freeze the process of research
and revision, and clairvoyance cannot be expected of Professor Red-
ish regarding matters that have taken shape since the book appeared.
The best that can be done and what, I think, he has succeeded in
doing, is to present a sufficiently thoughtful and resilient analysis of
contemporary topics that will aid us in examining developments that
follow the book's publication.
CONCLUSION
There are areas not covered by Professor Redish's book that
would complement the topics treated. This is hardly a criticism,
since the book is unparalleled in scope as it stands. It is more of a
request for the author to produce an encore with a second volume.
For example, it would be interesting to be able to compare his dis-
cussion of statutory federal question jurisdiction with developments
in judge-made pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,40 his discussion of
eleventh amendment doctrine with federal sovereign immunity,41
and his treatment of exhaustion of state judicial remedies with ex-
haustion of state administrative remedies.42 An examination of
federal habeas corpus,43 especially, would disclose when and to what
extent the possibility for federal judicial remedies in addition to
those discussed might be available. Professor Redish's analysis of
the Younger v. Harris doctrine provides extensive material for under-
standing the consequences of filing the federal lawsuit too late -
after state proceedings have begun. Missing, however, is an explana-
37. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
39. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
40. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
41. See P. BATOR, P. MISHIUN, D. SHAPIRo & H. WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 1373-77.
42. See Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41
U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (1974).
43. See Michael, The "New" Federalism and the Burger Court's Deference to the States in
Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 IowA L. REv. 233 (1979); Note, Guilt, Innocence, and Federal-
ism in Habeas Corpus, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (1980).
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tion of the equally difficult problems that plaintiffs encounter if their
lawsuits are filed too soon. These include problems of prematurity,
which derive from article III of the Constitution. A discussion of the
case or controversy requirement of article II44 would further com-
plement the author's Younger analysis (p. 314 & n.147). And finally,
a discussion of problems of federal judicial administration and their
relation to developments in the law of federal jurisdiction45 would be
useful.
But on the whole, I found Professor Redish's book informative
and constantly challenging. The thoroughness and honesty of his
technique demonstrates how much controversy exists in the field of
federal jurisdiction. It is a difficult branch of the law, one that at
times may lead scholars and practitioners to agree with the assess-
ment that "what the legal system cannot answer it organizes. ' 46 Pro-
fessor Redish's book is well organized, but the reader will find in it a
good many answers as well.
44. See Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence ofArticle IIM Perspectives on the "Case and Contro-
versy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1979).
45. For example, docket congestion in the federal courts of appeal, see Betten, Institutional
Reform in the Federal Courts, 52 IND. L.J. 63 (1976); Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the
Courts fAppeals: The Threat to the Function ofReview and the National Law, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 542 (1969), has undoubtedly influenced the trend in recent Supreme Court cases to read
statutory grants of federal appellate jurisdiction more narrowly. See Shreve, supra note 26, at
nn. 186-87 and accompanying text.
46. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 7 (1977).
[Vol. 80:688
